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SCIENCE FOR JUDGES 
Margaret A. Berger* 
This issue of the Journal of Law & Policy introduces a new 
feature: articles that deal with scientific issues that confront judges 
when they handle litigation in the twenty-first century. These 
articles are a felicitous outgrowth of a grant from the Common 
Benefit Trust established in the Silicone Breast Implant Products 
Liability Litigation to hold a series of conferences at Brooklyn 
Law School for federal and state judges to discuss complex 
questions that arise at the intersection of science and the law. The 
programs, under the auspices of Brooklyn Law School’s Center for 
Health Law and Policy, are being presented in collaboration with 
the Federal Judicial Center, the National Center of State Courts, 
and the Panel on Science, Law and Technology of the National 
Academy of Sciences. The pieces that follow are expanded and 
edited versions of papers that were originally presented by Drs. 
Eaton and Weed at the first Science for Judges program in March 
2003. 
The explosive growth of science and technology in our society 
has been mirrored by the increasing number of scientific and 
technological issues that arise in litigation. Particularly 
troublesome for the courts have been the difficult determinations 
about causation that arise in toxic tort cases when plaintiffs claim 
that exposure to a defendant’s product caused their injuries or 
disease. These are cases in which a great deal is at stake beyond 
compensation for the claimants and others adversely affected, even 
though the amounts claimed as damages may be enormous. An 
erroneous decision for the defendant may leave a dangerous 
product on the market and may persuade other corporations that 
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they risk little by not taking more stringent precautionary measures 
to protect the public. On the other hand, litigation may result in a 
valuable product being taken off the market, serious, perhaps fatal, 
financial harm to a defendant, congestion in the courts, and 
immense transaction costs. 
The crucial issue in these cases is almost always causation, 
proof of which must be provided by expert witnesses. Given the 
huge stakes in toxic tort cases, as well as escalating complaints 
about courts admitting “junk science,”1 it is probably not surprising 
that the use of expert testimony to prove causation captured the 
Supreme Court’s attention. In the past decade, the Supreme Court 
has issued a trilogy of opinions dealing with the admissibility of 
expert proof. The first two cases, Daubert v. Merrill Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 (1993) and General Electric v. Joiner3 
(1997), were toxic tort cases. In Daubert, the plaintiffs claimed 
that Benedectin, a drug used to control morning sickness in 
pregnant women, caused birth defects in their children. In Joiner, 
the plaintiff alleged that exposure to PCBs promoted his lung 
cancer. The third case, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael4 (1999), 
although not a toxic tort case, was a product liability action in 
which proof of causation was central; the plaintiff’s expert claimed 
that the rollover of a minivan, resulting in serious injuries and 
death, was caused by a defective tire. 
The trilogy imposed new obligations on the federal trial judge 
with regard to expert testimony. It anointed the judge as the 
“gatekeeper” who must screen all proffered expert testimony for 
relevancy and reliability before allowing it to be heard by a jury. 
Consequently, in a case that turns on science, if the court finds that 
a party’s scientific proof is not reliable—that is, not scientifically 
valid—the expert seeking to offer an opinion based on such 
                                                          
1 This phrase, which was given currency by Peter Huber’s book, GALILEO’S 
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991), was hardly the first attack 
on expert witnesses. Learned Hand was fulminating about venal experts at the 
turn of the last century. See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical 
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901). 
2 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
3 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
4 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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evidence will not be allowed to testify. Because causation is a 
necessary element of a plaintiff’s toxic tort case, exclusion of the 
plaintiff’s expert on causation will result in summary judgment for 
the defendant. The trilogy also established that when an appellate 
court reviews a trial judge’s ruling on admitting expert proof, it 
must use an abuse of discretion standard, deferring to the ruling of 
the lower court unless it is manifestly erroneous. 
Obviously, the Supreme Court trilogy has given enormous 
power and responsibility to the federal district courts in making 
them the gatekeepers who often have the final say on the 
admissibility of all expert testimony. And the trilogy has had an 
impact on state trial judges as well. By now, a majority of the 
states have opted to adopt some version of the federal approach, 
and even in states that have not formally adopted the trilogy, 
judges appear to be subjecting expert testimony to greater scrutiny. 
It is the difficulties that judges now face in having to identify 
sound science that led to the establishment of the Science for 
Judges Program. 
In toxic tort cases, the judicial screening burden is particularly 
onerous. Few judges come from educational backgrounds which 
provide them with the scientific and statistical training needed to 
understand and evaluate the validity of the epidemiological, 
toxicological, and clinical proof they are likely to encounter. 
Furthermore, the etiology of many diseases is as yet unknown. We 
are only on the threshold of unraveling genetic information and 
understanding how interactions between genetic and environmental 
factors can lead to adverse health effects. As a result, the judge 
ruling on the admissibility of expert proof may be hampered not 
only by his or her lack of scientific expertise, but also by the 
scientific uncertainty surrounding the question on which an expert 
seeks to testify and consequent disagreements among scientists and 
scientific disciplines. 
Because toxic tort cases have played such an important role in 
focusing judicial attention on scientific proof in the courtroom, and 
because these cases raise issues of grave societal concern, it 
seemed only fitting to devote the first Science for Judges program 
to an overview of issues that bear on proving causation in toxic tort 
cases. Dr. Eaton’s paper examines what can be known through the 
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application of basic toxicological principles. Dr. Weed surveys and 
critiques epidemiologists’ methodology in drawing causal 
inferences. 
Subsequent issues of the Journal of Law & Policy will publish 
other papers that were presented at Science for Judges programs. It 
is hoped that these articles will assist not only the participants who 
attend these programs but also a broader constituency of the legal 
community that reads these pages. 
 
